Georgia v. Russia Federation: A Question of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by Lucak, Natalia
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 18
Georgia v. Russia Federation: A Question of the
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
Natalia Lucak
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Natalia Lucak, Georgia v. Russia Federation: A Question of the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 27 Md. J. Int'l L. 323
(2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol27/iss1/18
16-LUCAKMACRO (MJIL reviewed FINAL)-NL edits 5/22/2012 10:16 AM 
NOTE 
323 
Georgia v. Russian Federation:  
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INTRODUCTION 
The limitations on both international and domestic courts‘ 
jurisdiction has created a gap in who will enforce human rights. First, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)1 has a limited role in 
international human rights disputes because only a state party may 
initiate proceedings at the ICJ.2 However, the victims of human rights 
violations are individuals and as such do not have access to the ICJ.  
The ICJ further restricted its already limited role in international 
human rights law in Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russian Federation).3 In this case, Georgia sought to stop the Russian 
Federation‘s military advances into its territory and the ethnic 
cleansing of native Georgians by claiming that Russia had violated 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD).4 Georgia claimed that Russia had 
engaged in widespread discrimination against ethnic Georgians in 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2011–2012; J.D. University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2012. The author wishes to thank her family and friends 
for their support, and Professor Peter Danchin for his advice and enthusiasm. 
 1. The ICJ is the ―principal judicial organ of the United Nations.‖ U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 2. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993.  
 3. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 4. Cindy Galway Buys, International Decisions: Application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: International Court of 
Justice Order on Provisional Measures and Application of CERD as Basis of Jurisdiction, 
103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 294, 294 (2009). Signed in 1965, this convention has the goal of 
eliminating racial discrimination around the world. International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination preamble, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195 [hereinafter CERD].  
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South Ossetia.5 It further asserted that Russia‘s discrimination 
included murder, torture, rape, deportation and forcible transfer, 
imprisonment, and hostage taking of ethnic Georgians.6 In addition, 
Georgia accused Russia of preventing forcibly displaced ethnic 
Georgians from returning to South Ossetia.7  
The ICJ initially found it had jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures to stop the violence.8 Notably, this was the first time the 
Court determined that it had jurisdiction under CERD in the fifty 
years since the treaty had been ratified.9 However, when the ICJ 
ultimately decided whether it had jurisdiction based on the merits of 
the case, the ICJ found it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
claim.10 The case highlights certain problems with the ICJ including 
how the court handles human rights issues. The ICJ could have 
expanded its jurisdiction to deal with cases of this nature. Instead, it 
further limited the scope of human rights cases that it may 
adjudicate.11 
As an alternative to the ICJ, states and individuals may initiate 
proceedings in regional human rights courts such as the European 
Court of Human Rights (EHCR), the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR), and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(ACJHR); however, these regional human rights courts only have 
jurisdiction over states that are parties to the relevant convention 
establishing the court.12 Furthermore, the ICJ recently held that 
 
 5. Application of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 21 (Oct. 15). South 
Ossetia is in the northern region of Georgia and it borders Russia. Regions and Territories: 
South Ossetia, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm 
(last updated Nov. 30, 2011). 
 6. Geor. v. Russ., 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 21.  
 7. Id. ¶ 3. 
 8. Id. ¶ 117. The ICJ has the jurisdiction to issue provisional measures before the Court 
renders its final decision on the merits of the case, when such measures are required to 
preserve the respective rights of the parties. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
supra note 2, art. 41; Shigeru Oda, Provisional Measures, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 541, 541 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 
1996).  
 9. Buys, supra note 4, at 294. 
 10. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, ¶ 184 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/16398.pdf. 
 11. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 12. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
Amended by Protocols 11 and 14, arts. 33–34, Nov. 4, 1950, 5 E.T.S. 10 [hereinafter EHCR 
Convention] (stating that any State party ―may refer to the [EHCR] any alleged breach of 
16-LUCAKMACRO (MJIL reviewed FINAL)-NL edits 5/22/2012 10:16 AM 
2012] GEORGIA V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION 325 
 
domestic courts do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims 
made against states that violate human rights.13 Neither international 
nor domestic courts have the right to enforce human rights in certain 
cases. Thus, there is a gap in who will enforce human rights. 
This article begins by explaining the historical background of the 
conflict between Russia and Georgia. Part II will discuss the purpose, 
goals, and jurisdiction of the ICJ. Then, this note will look at the 
purpose of CERD and the structure and procedure it creates for 
dealing with problems involving racial discrimination. Specifically, 
this note will explore the provisions that deal with dispute resolution 
and the jurisdiction of the ICJ as related to CERD. Part III examines 
Georgia v. Russian Federation case and the reasoning of the ICJ both 
with respect to its jurisdiction. The final section discusses the 
implications of its decision.  
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN GEORGIA 
AND RUSSIA  
The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia involved a region 
of Georgia called South Ossetia, which is located in the northern 
region of Georgia.14 South Ossetia shares a border and maintains 
―very close ties with Russia.‖15 Many South Ossetians are neither 
 
provisions of the Convention . . . by another High Contracting party‖ and that the EHCR 
―may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of 
the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols . . . .‖); American Convention on 
Human Rights, Pact of San José, Costa Rica, arts. 44, 61(1), Nov. 21, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter IACHR Convention] (stating that State parties 
and any person or group of people, ―may lodge petitions . . . containing denunciations or 
complaints of violation of the Convention by a State [p]arty‖ with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights which in turn may submit the case to the IACHR); Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, arts. 29–30, July 1, 2008, 
48 I.L.M. 317 [hereinafter ACJHR Protocol] (stating that State parties and individuals are 
―entitled to submit cases‖ to the ACJHR but that the Court is ―not . . . open to States which 
are not members of the [African] Union,‖ and that the Court has no ―jurisdiction to resolve a 
dispute involving a Member State that has not ratified the Protocol‖).  
 13. See Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 139 
(Feb. 3) (holding that Italy ―violated its obligation to respect [Germany‘s sovereign] 
immunity . . . by allowing civil claims to be brought against [Germany] based on violations 
of international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich . . . .‖). 
 14. BBC NEWS, supra note 5. 
 15. Russia/Georgia: All Parties in August/South Ossetia Conflict Violated Laws of War, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/russiageorgia-
all-parties-augustsouth-ossetia-conflict-violated-laws-war; INT‘L CRISIS GROUP, GEORGIA: 
AVOIDING WAR IN SOUTH OSSETIA 2 (2004). 
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ethnically Georgian nor Russian, and speak a distinct language.16 
There is a long history of tension between South Ossetia and 
Georgia.17 In 1918 and again in 1920, South Ossetia attempted to 
declare its independence from Georgia during the Ossetian 
rebellions.18 In 1923, after the Soviet Union conquered Georgia in 
1921, South Ossetia became an autonomous region in Georgia.19 
During the Soviet era, rivalries between the Georgians and South 
Ossetians continued to fester below the surface.20 The South 
Ossetians did not attempt to create an independent republic again 
until the 1990s.21  
In 1990, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast22 declared 
independence from Georgia once again.23 This declaration of 
independence sparked conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia 
from 1991 to 1992.24 Russian military command aided South Ossetia 
in this conflict.25 Local Russian military commanders ordered 
Russian troops to leave their barracks in Georgia and support the 
secessionists.26 In June 1992, Russia and Georgia agreed to a cease-
fire.27 As a result of this conflict, South Ossetia has been functionally 
independent from Georgia since the early 1990s.28 South Ossetia has 
its own parliament, economic policy, educational system, and army.29 
 
 16. Helen Womack & Mark Tran, Q&A: South Ossetia Dispute, GUARDIAN, Aug. 12, 
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/08/georgia.russia4; BBC NEWS, supra note 
5. 
 17. JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34618, RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT IN 
SOUTH OSSETIA: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 1 (2008). 
 18. INT‘L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 15, at 3. 
 19. NICHOL, supra note 17, at 1; PETER ROUDIK, L. LIBR. CONGRESS, RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION: LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAR IN GEORGIA 1 (2008); INT‘L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 
15, at 3. 
 20. INT‘L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 15, at 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is an administrative division of Georgia. Id. 
at 2. 
 23. Roy Allison, Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’, 
84 INT‘L AFF. 1145, 1146 (2008). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Charles King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis, 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 2, 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. NICHOL, supra note 17, at 1. 
 28. King, supra note 25, at 4. 
 29. Id.  
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After this period, Russia maintained a friendly relationship with 
South Ossetia and gave Russian passports to many South Ossetians.30  
Hostilities in the region arose again in 2004 when the President 
of Georgia decided to tighten border controls and break up large-
scale smuggling operations in the region.31 The President also ―sent 
several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel into 
South Ossetia.‖32 Additionally, ―Georgian guerrilla forces . . . 
reportedly entered the region.‖33  
Tensions reached a climax in the summer of 2008.34 Both South 
Ossetia and Georgia launched military attacks against each other after 
a bomb went off in a South Ossetian village.35 The explosion killed 
an Ossetian police chief and injured the head of the pro-Georgian 
government in South Ossetia, Dmitriy Sanakoyev.36 On July 8, 2008, 
the Russian air force flew patrols over South Ossetian airspace.37 
Russia claimed that it was merely trying to discourage Georgia from 
launching an attack on South Ossetia.38 
On August 7, 2008, both South Ossetia and Georgia accused 
each other of attacks.39 The Georgian President called for a ceasefire 
and requested the continuation of peace talks.40 However, Georgia 
alleged that South Ossetian forces did not stop attacking Georgian 
villages and as a result, Georgia began sending ground forces into 
South Ossetia.41 On August 8th, Russian tanks moved across the 
border into Georgia.42 The conflict lasted five days at which point, 
under the encouragement of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, 
acting on behalf of the European Union, Russia and Georgia signed a 
ceasefire agreement.43 This five-day war left hundreds dead and 
 
 30. Allison, supra note 23, at 1147.  
 31. NICHOL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 4. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA, 
REPORT 11 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html. 
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thousands as refugees.44 In response to Russia‘s military aid to South 
Ossetians, Georgia filed its Application against Russia under the 
CERD at the ICJ.45  
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND PROCEDURE 
The ICJ is the principal court of the United Nations and, as such, 
plays an important role in international law. This section will discuss 
the background of how the Court and its purpose. Next, it will discuss 
when the ICJ has jurisdiction to adjudicate a case before it.  
A. Background of the International Court of Justice 
On June 26, 1945, fifty-one countries established the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and security, to develop 
friendly relations among nations, and to support international 
collaboration in solving ―international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.‖46 
The UN Charter detailed the rights and obligations of members of the 
United Nations.47 Moreover, the Charter established the various 
organs and procedures of the organization.48 The UN Charter 
established the ICJ as the ―principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations.‖49  
The drafters of the UN Charter designed the ICJ to contribute to 
world peace through the judicial settlement of international disputes 
and to develop international law through its opinions.50 The rationale 
of the ICJ is set out in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states that, 
―[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
 
 44. King, supra note 25, at 2.  
 45. Buys, supra note 4, at 294.  
 46. Id. art. 1. 
 47. See generally id. (setting out the purposes, principles, structure, and procedure of the 
United Nations).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. art. 92. 
 50. MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS 
THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 20 (2003). 
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justice, are not endangered.‖51 All member of the United Nations are 
parties to the Statute of the ICJ (Statute), which is annexed to the UN 
Charter.52 The Statute set up the structure, organization, and 
procedure of the Court.53  
B. Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
The Court reviews two types of cases.54 The first type are 
contentious cases submitted to the Court by states.55 The Court‘s 
decisions in these cases are binding only on the parties to the 
dispute.56 The second type are advisory proceedings where the Court 
gives non-binding advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it 
by UN organs and specialized agencies.57 Advisory proceedings 
before the ICJ are open only to five organs of the UN and several 
specialized organizations.58 ―The UN General Assembly and Security 
Council may request advisory opinions on any legal issue.‖59 The 
other UN organs and specialized agencies, which have been 
authorized to seek advisory opinions, can only request an opinion 
regarding a ―legal question arising within the scope of their 
 
 51. U.N. Charter art. 2(3). 
 52. Id. art. 92; art. 93(1). 
 53. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 2. 
 54. How the Court Works, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
 55. Id. Some disputes the Court has resolved relate to land frontiers, territorial 
sovereignty, the use of force, hostage taking, rights of passage, and economic rights. ICJ: 
Mission & History Guide to Archives of International Organizations,  
UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. AND CULTURAL ORG., http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng/ 
presentation_print.php?idOrg=1016 (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 56. Rules of Court, 6 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 151. 
 57. How the Court Works, supra note 54. 
 58. Organs and Agencies of the United Nations Authorized to Request Advisory 
Opinions, INT‘L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2 
=2&p3=1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). The five organs include the General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Interim 
Committee of the General Assembly. Id. The specialized organizations that can request 
advisory opinions are the International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), and United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO). Id. 
 59. How the Court Works, supra note 54. 
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activities.‖60 The requesting organ or agency may adhere to the 
opinion through any available means.61 However, when the 
concerned organ or agency implements an opinion, then it is as 
though the opinion becomes international law.62 Since 1946, the ICJ 
has delivered 125 opinions in contentious cases and twenty-six 
advisory opinions.63 
For the ICJ to review contentious cases, it must have jurisdiction 
to do so.64 The ICJ has jurisdiction over legal disputes between 
member states concerning ―the interpretation of a treaty; any question 
of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and the 
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation.‖65 In addition, only states may be parties in 
cases before the Court.66 Consequently, neither individuals, 
organizations, nor companies may have cases adjudicated in the ICJ. 
This is particularly important when considering human rights law 
because individuals are generally the victims of human rights 
violations. However, individuals cannot seek redress in the ICJ.  
The ICJ may adjudicate claims between states that are parties to 
a treaty conferring ICJ jurisdiction over certain disputes.67 Where 
jurisdiction exists through a treaty, the Court can only adjudicate 
cases relating to disputes about the interpretation or application of the 
treaty.68 While treaties can confer jurisdiction, parties to the treaty 
may make reservations regarding the jurisdiction of the ICJ.69 A 
reservation is a statement made by a state when it is ―signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty‖ that excludes 
or modifies the ―legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, INT‘L COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited Jan. 3, 2012); List of 
Advisory Proceedings Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction, INT‘L 
COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012). 
 64. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 36(1). 
 65. Id. art. 36(2). 
 66. Id. art. 34(1). 
 67. Id. art. 36(1). 
 68. See AMR, supra note 50, at 180. 
 69. Id. at 194. 
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application to that State.‖70 Therefore, if a state does not want to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ when it signs or ratifies a treaty, 
it may make a reservation to the provision that confers jurisdiction on 
the ICJ. If there is ever a dispute about whether the Court has 
jurisdiction, a decision by the Court will settle the matter.71 
In addition, the ICJ has the jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures before the Court renders its final decision on the merits of 
the case, when such measures are required to preserve the respective 
rights of the parties.72 A state party may make a written request for 
the indication of provisional measures at any time during the course 
of proceedings.73 In such cases, the ICJ must at least find that it has 
prima facie jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.74 When determining 
whether to issue provisional measures, the Court evaluates the 
urgency of the situation and the potential for irreparable harm to the 
parties.75 These provisions are binding on the parties.76 The measures 
protect the rights that the Court will review at the merits stage of the 
case and which relate to the subject of the application.77 If the Court 
later finds it did not have jurisdiction, the provisional measures no 
longer have legal effect.78  
In making any of its decisions, the ICJ shall apply international 
conventions, international custom, the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations, and also ―judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.‖79 
  
 
 70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 71. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 36(6). 
 72. Id. art. 41. See also Shigeru Oda, supra note 8, at 541 (―The indication of provisional 
measures—which is deemed to be an almost essential instrument in the panoply of any 
judicial process—is intended to preserve, pending the final decision, the respective rights of 
the parties before the Court.‖). 
 73. Rules of the Court, supra note 56, at 137. 
 74. Shigeru Oda, supra note 8, at 549. 
 75. Id. at 551.  
 76. La Grand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 9, ¶¶ 28–29 (Mar. 
3). 
 77. Shigeru Oda, supra note 8, at 551. 
 78. Id. at 545; Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 61 (Dec. 20). 
 79. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION  
CERD is the international community‘s tool for combating racial 
discrimination.80 The primary purpose of CERD was to adopt all 
necessary measures to eliminate racial discrimination.81 CERD 
―opposes racist doctrines‖ and promotes ―understanding between 
races.‖82 Lastly, CERD attempts ―to build an international 
community free from all forms of racial segregation and racial 
discrimination.‖83 Both Georgia and Russia are parties to CERD.84  
CERD defines racial discrimination as: 
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based 
on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.85  
 CERD lists specific ways in which state parties should eliminate 
and prevent discrimination.86 It declares that each state shall agree to 
not ―sponsor, defend, or support racial discrimination by any person 
or organization.‖87 Furthermore, members shall condemn all 
propaganda and organizations that are based on a theory of 
superiority of one race or group of persons over another.88 
Additionally, each state party shall declare as a punishable offense all 
dissemination of ideas based on ―racial superiority or hatred, 
 
 80. Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 283 (1985) 
(quoting 33 UN FAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 108, 109, UN Doc. A/33/18 (1978)) (―It [CERD] 
has been eloquently described as ‗the international community‘s only tool for combating 
racial discrimination which is at one and the same time universal in reach, comprehensive in 
scope, legally binding in character, and equipped with built-in measures of 
implementation.‘‖). 
 81. CERD, supra note 4, pmbl. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS, (Mar. 9, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-2.en.pdf (listing all state participants 
and dates of signature, ratification, accession, and succession).  
 85. CERD, supra note 4, art. 1(1). 
 86. See generally id.  
 87. Id. art. 2(1)(b). 
 88. Id. art. 4. 
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incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons.‖89  
For present purposes, the important rights that require equality 
are the right to security against violence, political rights (particularly 
the right to vote and stand for election), the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the territory of a state, and the right 
to leave any country and to return to one‘s own country.90 CERD 
commands that the parties to the convention assure these rights to all 
people within their jurisdiction.91 
CERD also establishes a procedure to address violations of the 
treaty. Specifically, CERD creates the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (Committee), which helps to ensure that 
state parties are fulfilling their obligations under CERD.92 If a state 
believes that another state party is violating provisions of CERD, that 
state can bring the issue to the attention of the Committee.93 The 
Committee then transmits the message to the state party accused of 
violating the treaty.94 The accused state has three months to submit a 
written explanation to the Committee clarifying the matter and the 
remedy, if any, that the state has instituted.95 If the matter is not 
resolved to the satisfaction of both parties within six months of the 
initial communication, either state can refer the matter to the 
Committee again.96 The Committee will then handle the matter after 
it has determined that the parties have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies.97 Most importantly for the purposes of this note, 
Article 22 of CERD provides that any dispute between two or more 
state parties related to the interpretation or application of CERD that 
is not settled through negotiation or by the Committee may, at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the ICJ for 
decision, unless the parties to the dispute agree to another mode of 
settlement.98 
 
 89. Id. art. 4(a). 
 90. Id. art. 5. 
 91. See id. art. 6. 
 92. See id. art. 8(1). 
 93. Id. art. 11(1). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. art. 11(2). 
 97. Id. art. 11(3). 
 98. Id. art. 22. 
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IV. THE COURT‘S DECISION 
As previously discussed, tensions between Georgia and the 
South Ossetian have existed for many decades.99 In August 2008, 
hostilities between the two parties intensified, leading to violence in 
South Ossetia.100 At that time, Russia, which had been supporting the 
South Ossetian separatist movement, sent its military into Georgian 
territory.101 On August 12, 2008, Georgia initiated proceedings 
before the ICJ against Russia for ―its actions on and around the 
territory of Georgia‖ in breach of CERD.102 Georgia sought to ensure 
that, under CERD, the individual rights of all people in Georgia‘s 
territory were ―respected and protected.‖103 It charged Russia with 
violating CERD through its interventions in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia since 1990.104 More specifically, Georgia claimed that 
Russia violated the provisions of CERD when it engaged in practices 
of racial discrimination reflected in acts including murder, torture, 
rape, deportation and forcible transfer, imprisonment and hostage 
taking.105 Furthermore, Georgia accused Russia of the systematic 
denial, on discriminatory grounds, of the right of South Ossetia‘s 
ethnic Georgians to return to South Ossetia.106 Lastly, Russia failed to 
condemn racial discrimination and all propaganda which promoted 
racial discrimination.107 In Georgia‘s application to the Court, it 
requested that the ICJ require that Russia cease military activities in 
Georgia, ensure the ―prompt and effective return of internally 
displaced persons to South Ossetia,‖ pay compensation for its role in 
supporting the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the 1991 – 1994 
conflicts, and also pay for all injuries ―resulting from its 
internationally wrongful acts.‖108 
 
 99. See supra Part I. See also Allison, supra note 23, at 1146. 
 100. Tyler B. Musselman, Skirmishing for Information: The Flaws of the International 
Legal System as Evidenced by the Russian-Georgian Conflict of 2008, 19 TRANSNAT‘L. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 318 (2010).  
 101. See Allison, supra note 23, at 1147; Musselman, supra note 100, at 318–19. 
 102. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 4 (Aug. 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14657.pdf. 
 103. Id. ¶ 1. 
 104. See id. ¶¶ 4, 6. 
 105. See id. ¶ 81(a). 
 106. See id.  
 107. See id. ¶ 82(c)–(e). 
 108. See id. ¶¶ 83(b), (e), (i). 
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On August 14, 2008, Georgia filed a request for the indication of 
provisional measures by the ICJ to ― preserve [its] rights under 
CERD to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by 
Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and 
foreign mercenaries.‖109 On August 25 2008, Georgia filed an 
Amended Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of 
Protection.110 Given that Russia had invaded South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia on August 8, 2008, and had taken control of the region, 
Georgia requested that the Court order the provisional measures to 
prevent irreparable harm to the rights of ethnic Georgians to be 
secure in their persons and to be protected against violence in the 
Georgian territory that was under the effective control of Russia.111 
Georgia requested that the ICJ ―protect its citizens against violent 
discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces.‖ 112 
A. The Court’s Decision to Issue Provisional Measures 
The ICJ declared that when a state party makes a request for the 
indication of provisional measures, the Court does not need to 
definitively determine if it has jurisdiction over a matter before 
deciding whether to issue the measures.113 However, the Court must, 
at least, have prima facie jurisdiction over the case. 114For this reason, 
the Court examined whether the claims made by Georgia afforded it 
prima facie jurisdiction to issue the provisional measures.115 As 
mentioned earlier, Article 22 of CERD, which allows the ICJ to 
adjudicate a claim, requires (1) that there be a dispute between the 
 
 109. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 3 (Apr. 1) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (addition in original). 
 110. Id. ¶ 5. 
 111. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Amended Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection 
Submitted by the Government of Georgia (Geor. v. Russ.), ¶ 23 (Aug. 25, 2008), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14689.pdf. 
 112. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of 
Protection Submitted by the Government of the Republic Georgia, ¶ 1 (Aug. 14, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14663.pdf. 
 113. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 85 (Oct. 15). 
 114. Shigeru Oda, supra note 8, at 549. 
 115. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2008 
I.C.J. 353, ¶ 85 (Oct. 15).  
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parties and (2) that the parties have not been able to settle the dispute 
through negotiation or through a complaint to the Committee.116 
The Court found that there was in fact a dispute about the 
interpretation of CERD since the parties disagreed about whether 
Russia had violated Articles 2 and 5 of CERD.117 In addition, 
Georgia‘s claims dealt with various rights under CERD, thus 
jurisdiction could be found under CERD.118 The Court also claimed 
that CERD did not include a territorial restriction, thus it was 
inconsequential that the racial discrimination occurred outside of 
Russia‘s territory.119 The ICJ found this was sufficient to establish the 
existence of a dispute between the parties relating to the 
interpretation and application of CERD.120 
The Court further determined it had prima facie jurisdiction in 
this case because preconditions set out by Article 22 of CERD had 
been met.121 The preconditions require that the parties settle the 
dispute through negotiation or through a complaint to the 
Committee.122 The Court determined that there did not have to be 
formal negotiations between state parties to invoke Article 22 of 
CERD, but there must be at least some attempt to initiate discussion 
with the opposing state party.123 The Court found that the issues 
raised by Georgia had been discussed in bilateral contacts between 
the parties, and that these problems had not yet been resolved prior to 
Georgia filing the application.124 This demonstrated that the state 
parties had tried to negotiate before initiating the ICJ proceedings.125 
For these reasons, the Court found that it had prima facie jurisdiction 
over this matter.126  
The Court held that it could properly issue provisional measures 
since there was imminent risk of irreparable harm in the form of loss 
of life, bodily injury, hardship, and anguish.127 The Court ordered 
 
 116. CERD, supra note 4, art. 22. 
 117. Geor. v. Russ., Provisional Measures, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 112. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at ¶ 109. 
 120. See id. ¶ 112. 
 121. Id. ¶ 117. 
 122. See id. ¶ 113. 
 123. Id. ¶ 114. 
 124. Id. ¶ 115. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. ¶ 117. 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 142, 146. 
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both Georgia and Russia to ―refrain from any act of racial 
discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions.‖ 128 
Second, the ICJ required that both parties cease supporting racial 
discrimination.129 Third, the Court ordered both parties to guarantee 
the security of persons and protection of property without regard to 
national or ethnic origin.130 Lastly, the Court directed the parties to 
do all in their power to ―ensure that public authorities and public 
institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of 
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or 
institutions.‖131 
B. The Final Decision of the International Court of Justice 
On December 1, 2009, Russia presented four objections to the 
ICJ‘s initial decision to issue provisional measures.132 Russia‘s first 
objection was that the requirements for the Court‘s jurisdiction had 
not been met since there was not a dispute between the parties with 
respect to the interpretation or application of CERD.133 Second, 
procedural requirements of Article 22 of CERD had not been met 
since there had not been any negotiations between the parties prior to 
initiating proceedings with the ICJ.134 Third, Russia contended that 
the alleged wrongful conduct took place outside of its territory and, 
therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case.135 
Fourth, if there was jurisdiction, it was limited to events that occurred 
after the entry into force of CERD as between the parties, on July 2, 
1999.136  
1. First Objection: Existence of a Dispute 
The Court echoed Article 22 of CERD and explained that the 
dispute must be ―with respect to the interpretation or application of 
[the] Convention.‖137 It held that states do not have to expressly refer 
to the treaty in its exchanges to invoke the instrument before the 
 
 128. Id. ¶ 149. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 22 (Apr. 1, 2011). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting CERD, supra note 4, art. 22). 
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Court.138 However, the exchanges must refer to the ―subject-matter of 
the treaty with sufficient clarity‖ so that the state against which the 
claim is made understands that there is a dispute with regard to that 
subject matter.139 Furthermore, the Court declared that when deciding 
whether there is a dispute, the Court must  
[D]etermine (1) whether the record shows a disagreement 
on a point of law or fact between the two States; (2) 
whether that disagreement is with respect to the 
interpretation or application of CERD, as required by 
[A]rticle 22 of CERD; and (3) whether that disagreement 
existed as of the date of the Application.140  
When examining the exchanges between the state parties to 
determine whether there was a dispute, the Court focused on 
statements made by the executive branch of each state since the 
executive represents the state in its international relations.141 Thus, 
the Court gave any statements made by the legislature of either state 
less weight than a statement by the executive. The Court also 
examined documents from 1990 until the date of Application.142 
When reviewing these documents, the Court looked for statements 
that might indicate there was a dispute between Georgia and Russia 
prior to the initiation of proceedings.143 
The Court distinguished between documents that were produced 
before July 2, 1999, and documents that were produced after because 
Georgia did not become a party to CERD until that date and therefore 
the treaty relationship between Georgia and Russia under CERD did 
not exist.144 The ICJ reviewed these earlier documents to place into 
context the documents issued after CERD entered into force between 
the two parties.145  
In reviewing the documents produced before 1999, the Court 
concluded that none of the documents provided any basis for finding 
there was a dispute based on racial discrimination before July 
 
 138. Id. ¶ 30. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. ¶ 31. 
 141. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 
 142. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. 
 143. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
 144. Id. ¶ 34. 
 145. Id. ¶ 50. 
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1999.146 The reasons for this finding relate to the authors of the 
statements, the intended addressee, and the content.147 The author of 
several of the documents was the Georgian Parliament and the 
President did not endorse these documents.148 Thus, according to the 
Court, the Georgian government did not intend those statements for 
the international community.149 Another problem was the subject 
matter of the documents since they referenced concerns about the use 
of force and not racial discrimination.150 
The Court next reviewed documents issued between July 1999 
and the beginning of the conflict in August 2008.151 Upon looking at 
these records, the Court concluded there was no legal dispute 
between Georgia and Russia during that period with respect to 
Russia‘s compliance with CERD.152 The Court reviewed reports to 
monitoring committees of various treaties, including the reports 
related to CERD, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT).153 In these reports and other documents, the Court 
commented that Georgia did not direct criticism against Russia based 
on CERD.154 Even if there was some criticism, it did not amount to 
an allegation against Russia regarding its compliance with CERD.155 
Finally, the Court reviewed documents from August 7, 2008, to 
August 12, 2008, the period during which the violence between 
Georgia and Russia occurred.156 The ICJ concluded that, during this 
period, a legal dispute concerning CERD did arise.157 The Court 
based this finding on the fact that there had been exchanges about 
Russia‘s compliance with CERD between a Georgian and Russian 
 
 146. Id. ¶ 63. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. ¶¶ 37, 63–64. 
 150. Id. ¶ 63. 
 151. Id. ¶ 65. 
 152. Id. ¶ 105. 
 153. Id. ¶ 65. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. ¶ 67. 
 156. Id. ¶¶ 106–13. 
 157. Id. ¶ 113. 
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representative in the UN Security Council on August 10, 2008.158 
Furthermore, the Georgian President had made claims on August 9th 
and 11th about the Russian military‘s violence in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to which the Russian Foreign Minister had responded on 
August 12th.159 For this reason, the Court found there was a legal 
dispute between the parties and dismissed Russia‘s first objection.160 
2. Second Objection: Procedural Conditions of Article 22 of CERD 
a. How to Interpret Article 22 of CERD 
The Court next considered Russia‘s second objection, whether 
the requirements for ICJ jurisdiction had been satisfied.161 As 
mentioned earlier, Article 22 of CERD states that the ICJ has 
jurisdiction over any dispute between two or more state parties, 
which is ―not settled by negotiation or by procedures expressly 
provided for in [the] Convention.‖162 In interpreting this statement, 
the Court considered ―the ordinary meaning of the terms in their 
context and in light‖ of the purpose of CERD and the ―travaux 
préparatoires of CERD.‖163 
When considering the ordinary meaning of CERD, the Court 
explained that it must give effect to Article 22.164 Since there are two 
modes of dispute settlement described in Article 22, the Court found 
this suggested that there is an affirmative duty to resort to these two 
methods of dispute settlement before the Court could have 
jurisdiction.165 In addition, the Court noted that when interpreting 
other treaties with a similar jurisdiction clause, the Court had 
interpreted any reference to other methods of dispute resolution as a 
precondition to the Court having jurisdiction.166 For these reasons, 
the Court concluded that negotiations or other procedures ―expressly 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id ¶¶ 109–13. 
 160. Id. ¶ 114. 
 161. Id. ¶ 115. 
 162. CERD, supra note 4, art 22. 
 163. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 122 (Oct. 15). 
Travaux préparatoires is the drafting history and discussions held when writing a treaty. See 
id. ¶¶142–47. 
 164. Id. ¶ 133. 
 165. Id. ¶ 134. 
 166. Id. ¶¶ 133, 136.  
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provided‖ for in CERD were ―preconditions‖ to it finding that it had 
jurisdiction.167  
When reviewing the travaux préparatoires related to CERD, the 
ICJ noted that it could not draw firm inferences as to whether the 
drafters intended the negotiations or the procedures expressly 
provided for in the treaty to act as preconditions for finding 
jurisdiction.168 However, the Court determined that the travaux 
préparatoires did not suggest that the ICJ‘s reading of the ordinary 
meaning of Article 22 was incorrect.169 Thus, the Court found that 
negotiations and the procedures provided for in the Convention were 
preconditions to finding jurisdiction.170 
b. Question of Whether the Precondition Was Satisfied 
The Court determined that the precondition is only met when 
there had been a failure of negotiations or when the negotiations have 
become deadlocked or futile.171 Whether a negotiation has ―failed 
or . . . futile‖ is a question of ―fact for consideration in each case.‖172 
The Court looked at precedent and found that negotiations do not 
necessarily have to be formal.173 The Court would recognize when 
there was ―diplomacy by conference or parliamentary diplomacy.‖174 
The negotiations must relate to the dispute, which must ―concern the 
substantive obligations contained in the treaty in question.175  
In this case, it was only possible for Georgia and Russia to 
negotiate matters in dispute from August 9–12, 2008, because that is 
when the dispute existed.176 Based on this information, the Court 
needed to answer two questions. First, whether there were 
negotiations between Georgia and Russia ―concerning the 
interpretation or application of CERD.‖177 Second, if the parties did 
engage in negotiations, whether those negotiations failed.178 The 
 
 167. Id. ¶ 141. 
 168. Id. ¶ 147. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. ¶ 148. 
 171. Id. ¶ 159 (collecting citations).  
 172. Id. ¶ 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. Id. ¶ 161. 
 176. Id. ¶ 168.  
 177. Id. ¶ 169. 
 178. Id. 
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Court looked at exchanges between Georgian and Russian 
representatives and found that Russia had not ―dismiss[ed] the 
possibility of future discussions‖ and, thus, negotiations had not 
failed.179 In addition, the subject matter of discussions between 
Georgia and Russia was not about Russia‘s compliance with 
CERD.180 For these reasons, the Court found there had not been 
negotiations prior to the initiation of proceedings.181 Therefore, the 
preconditions of Article 22 had not been met and the ICJ did not have 
jurisdiction.182 
c. Dissent 
The five-judge dissent argued that the ICJ did, in fact, have 
jurisdiction.183 The dissent disagreed with the majority‘s decision on 
the second preliminary objection.184 It argued that any ―reasonable 
possibility of settling the dispute by negotiation had been exhausted 
by the date on which the proceedings were instituted.‖185 When 
interpreting Article 22 of CERD, the Court sought to ensure that this 
provision had practical effect and did not consider other elements 
important in interpreting the provision.186 For example, the Court did 
not look at the literal meaning of the provision when the terms are 
―given their most common meaning.‖187 If the Court had, it would 
have found that an attempt at settlement did not have to be made 
before reference to the ICJ.188 Furthermore, ―the exhaustion of 
diplomatic negotiations,‖ as a general rule, is not a mandatory 
precondition for the ICJ to have jurisdiction.189  
The dissent argued that neither the literal meaning of Article 22 
of CERD nor the travaux préparatoires supported the majority‘s 
 
 179. Id. ¶ 180. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. ¶¶ 181–82.  
 182. Id. ¶ 184. 
 183. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections (Joint Dissenting Opinion of 
President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge Ad Hoc Gaja), ¶ 2 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/16422.pdf. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. ¶ 12. 
 186. Id. ¶ 22. 
 187. Id. ¶ 23. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. ¶ 24. 
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interpretation.190 Furthermore, the dissent maintained that requiring 
the preconditions in question to be fulfilled ―before the seisin of the 
Court‖ did not follow from recent cases.191 What is important is that 
the preconditions are met by the date when the Court decides on its 
jurisdiction.192 The dissent noted that in this case, the majority only 
looked at whether the preconditions had been met before the date that 
Georgia filed proceedings.193 It concluded that this reasoning was at 
odds with the general thrust of the ICJ‘s most recent jurisprudence.194  
The dissent asserted that assuming Article 22 of CERD sets out 
preconditions for the ICJ jurisdiction, those preconditions were 
satisfied in this case since there had been an unsuccessful attempt to 
negotiate between Georgia and Russia.195 Additionally, the dissent 
argued that the majority should have determined whether on the date 
the proceedings were instituted there was still a ―reasonable 
possibility of negotiating a settlement of the dispute.‖196 The dissent 
believed there was no reasonable possibility.197 In the dissent‘s view, 
it was sufficient for Georgia to show it had made known the existence 
of its claims against Russia, thus enabling Russia to respond.198 The 
dissent found that Georgia had met this standard and, thus, the ICJ 
should have jurisdiction.199  
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The ICJ‘s decision restricted established precedent. When 
determining that there was a dispute, the Court only considered 
statements made by the executive branch instead of also looking at 
other parts of government also involved in foreign policy.200 In 
deciding that the preconditions of Article 22 had not been met, the 
Court not only required that negotiations were initiated as required by 
precedent, but that negotiations had failed or become futile.201 These 
 
 190. Id. ¶¶ 23, 34. 
 191. Id. ¶ 35. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. ¶ 36. 
 194. Id. ¶ 35. 
 195. Id. ¶ 38. 
 196. Id. ¶ 67. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. ¶ 72. 
 199. Id. ¶ 84. 
 200. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 201. See supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
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strict standards further limit the ICJ‘s already restricted role as an 
enforcer of human rights.  
States and individuals may initiate proceedings in regional 
human rights courts as an alternative to the ICJ. However, these 
regional human rights courts only have jurisdiction over states that 
are parties to the relevant convention establishing the court.202 
Furthermore, the ICJ recently held that domestic courts do not have 
the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims made against states who violated 
human rights.203 Neither international nor domestic courts have the 
right to enforce human rights in certain cases. Thus, there is a gap in 
who will enforce human rights. 
This section will first analyze the ICJ‘s decision and discuss how 
the Court further restricted its role in international human rights law 
by reading precedent narrowly. Then it will examine the implications 
of this case on international human rights law. 
A. Analysis of the Court‘s Decision in Georgia v. Russian 
Federation 
1. Whether there is a Dispute 
When determining whether the ICJ has jurisdiction over a 
matter, the Court must first decide whether there is a dispute related 
to the interpretation or application of CERD.204 A dispute is ―a 
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or 
interests between parties.‖205 A mere assertion by one party is not 
sufficient to prove there is a dispute.206 Furthermore, it is not 
―adequate to show that the interests of the two parties . . . are in 
conflict.‖ 207 In order to establish the existence of a dispute, ―[i]t must 
be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the 
other.‖208 The determination of whether there is an international 
dispute is based on an objective view of the parties‘ arguments rather 
 
 202. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 203. See Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 139 
(Feb. 3). 
 204. CERD, supra note 4, art. 22. 
 205. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30). 
 206. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 
I.C.J. 319, 328 (Dec. 21). 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id.  
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than the subjective view of the parties themselves.209 In addition, the 
applicant must establish a reasonable connection between the treaty 
that gives jurisdiction and the claims submitted to the Court.210  
In this case, the Court found that there was a dispute. When 
looking at the ICJ‘s findings in previous cases, however, the Court‘s 
finding in this case narrowed the scope of the meaning of ―dispute.‖ 
First, the Court only focused on the executive branches‘ statements 
when determining that there was a dispute, citing Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda) as precedent.211 However, the Court‘s decision to only use 
statements made by the executive branch does not necessarily follow 
from that case. There, the Court stated that the Head of State, Heads 
of Government, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have the power 
to represent a state and bind it to treaties or other international 
commitments.212 In this case, the ICJ is not determining whether 
Georgia or Russia is bound to a treaty or other commitment, but 
merely determining whether there is a dispute. Thus, only reviewing 
documents produced by the executive branch unnecessarily limits the 
evidence that the Court considers.  
Second, in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), the 
Court found that Iranian legislation was admissible.213 In this case, a 
number of Georgia‘s parliamentary resolutions were submitted to the 
United Nations as statement of the government‘s position.214 
Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that the Georgian 
Parliament‘s statements were made contrary to the authority of the 
 
 209. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory 
Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 74 (Mar. 30). 
 210. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, ¶ 81 (Nov. 26). 
 211. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 37 (Apr. 1) 
(citing Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶¶ 46–47 (Feb. 3)). 
 212. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 46 (Feb. 3). 
 213. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objections, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 107 
(July 22). 
 214. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 36 (Apr. 1). 
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Georgian executive.215 Thus, the ICJ should have considered the 
parliamentary statements.  
Additionally the ICJ failed to note that the Court in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda asserted that ―with increasing 
frequency in modern international relations other persons 
representing a state in specific fields may be authorized by that state 
to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their 
purview.‖216 The Court should have considered statements of the 
legislature because the Georgian Parliament determines the ―principle 
directions‖ of domestic and foreign policy and its actions play a role 
in international relations.217 Thus, pursuant to Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Rwanda, the Georgian Parliament may be considered 
a body representing Georgia in a specific field and is, therefore, 
authorized to bind Georgia.  
Had the ICJ considered statements by the Georgian Parliament 
the Court would have found there was a dispute before the conflict in 
2008. The ICJ had evidence indicating that the Georgian Parliament 
accused Russian troops of ethnic cleansing in the Georgian territory 
of Abkhazia in 1993.218 It also had evidence demonstrating that the 
Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution in 2001 alleging that since 
the deployment of Russian peacekeepers under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, ethnic cleansing continued.219 
Georgia‘s claim that Russia was a party to a conflict involving ethnic 
cleansing is reasonably connected to CERD. Therefore, this dispute 
began prior to the August 2008 conflict.  
2. Question of Prior Negotiations 
Article 22 of CERD also requires that the two parties hold 
negotiations before initiating proceedings at the ICJ.220 In Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), the ICJ declared that just ―because a State 
has not expressly referred in negotiations with another State‖ to that 
state‘s violations of a particular treaty, does not mean that a state 
 
 215. See id. at 24–47 (showing that the Georgian executive branch did not counter the 
Georgian Parliament‘s position). 
 216. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, 2006 I.C.J. ¶ 47. 
 217. Sakartvelos K'onstitutsia [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 24, 1995, art. 48. (Geor.). 
 218. Geor. v. Russ., 2011 I.C.J. ¶ 52 (Apr. 1). 
 219. Id. ¶ 71. 
 220. Id. ¶ 112.  
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cannot initiate proceedings against the state who is violating the 
treaty.221 Furthermore, in that case, the Court found that the United 
States was ―well aware‖ it was in breach of international obligations 
before Nicaragua brought the case.222 In South West Africa (Ethiopia 
v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), the ICJ claimed that 
negotiations do not necessarily have to be lengthy; rather, the fact 
that a discussion has commenced is sufficient.223 The requirement to 
negotiate does not imply a requirement to make an agreement.224 
Lastly, preconditions for jurisdiction do not have to be met on the day 
that the state party submits its application to the Court, but rather 
must be satisfied by the date that the Court makes its decision 
regarding jurisdiction.225 
In this case, the Court once again narrowed the standard 
established in previous ICJ decisions by requiring that the 
negotiations fail or are deadlocked before initiating proceedings in 
the ICJ.226 Precedent does not necessitate such a strict requirement. 
Georgia could still initiate proceedings in the ICJ even if it had not 
expressly referred to CERD in negotiations. Furthermore, similar to 
the Nicaragua v. United States of America case, Russia likely knew 
its conduct was in violation of its international obligations.227 Georgia 
submitted evidence to demonstrate it had initiated negotiations with 
Russia concerning racial discrimination in various fora.228 Lastly, the 
Court did not need to determine whether preconditions had been met 
by the day that Georgia initiated proceedings but rather by the date 
that the ICJ made its determination regarding jurisdiction.229 The 
Court could have considered any negotiations that related to the 
conflict after Georgia submitted its application to the Court on 
 
 221. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, ¶ 83 (Nov. 26). 
 222. Id.  
 223. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 
I.C.J. 319, 345 (Dec. 21) (quoting Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions , 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 2, at 13 (Aug. 30)). 
 224. Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A/B) No. 42, at 116 (Oct. 15). 
 225. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Preliminary Objections, 2008 I.C.J. 412 ¶ 85 (Nov. 18). 
 226. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 159 (Apr. 1). 
 227. Nicar. v. U.S., 1984 I.C.J. ¶ 83. 
 228. Geor. v. Russ., 2011 I.C.J. ¶ 164. 
 229. See Croat. v. Serb., 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 85. 
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August 12, 2008. Therefore, Georgia did meet the preconditions 
required to initiate proceedings in the ICJ under CERD. 
B. Implications for International Human Rights  
Human rights treaties challenge how we think about the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. It makes us question whether the ICJ can 
resolve legal disputes related to human rights treaties. This case 
illustrates the limitations of the ICJ as it relates to CERD and other 
human rights treaties. However, if the ICJ is not adjudicating claims 
brought under human rights treaties, who will enforce human rights 
law? In this case, Georgia turned to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) to resolve the dispute.230 The ECHR, in contrast to 
the ICJ, found that it did indeed have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Georgia‘s claim.231 Thus, the ECHR will adjudicate the case between 
Georgia and Russia.232  
While regional courts such as the ECHR, IACHR, and the 
ACJHR are available to both individuals and states, they are not 
accessible to them when the state party violating human rights is not 
a member to the regional human rights convention.233 Thus, many 
human rights claims cannot be adjudicated in the regional human 
rights courts. Furthermore, the ICJ recently held that domestic courts 
do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims made against states 
who violated human rights.234 Thus, there is a gap in who will 
enforce human rights. 
1. ICJ Limitation as Related to Human Rights Treaties 
This case illustrates the limitations of the ICJ as it relates to 
CERD and other human rights treaties. In issuing the provisional 
measures, this was the first time that the ICJ found jurisdiction under 
 
 230. See Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., Preliminary 
Objections, ¶ 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html& 
documentId=897303&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649. 
 231. Id. at ¶ 102. 
 232. As of the time of printing, the ECHR has not scheduled public hearings for Georgia 
v. Russia (II). See Provisional List of Scheduled Public Hearings, EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Pending+Cases/Pending+cases/ 
Calendar+of+scheduled+hearings/ (last updated Apr. 13, 2012). 
 233. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 234. See Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 139 
(Feb. 3). 
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CERD in the fifty years the treaty has existed.235 While it seems that 
Georgia‘s complaints under CERD were tangential to the actual issue 
of Russia‘s invasion into Georgia, the Court took a formalistic 
approach to determining that it did not have jurisdiction.236 It did not 
address the substantive issues of the Russian invasion and the fact 
that CERD did not deal with use of force issues.237 Although this case 
may not be a classic human rights case in which CERD would apply, 
the ICJ focused purely on whether the preconditions of Article 22 of 
CERD had been met. Therefore, this case has implications for future 
cases relating to human rights treaties that give the ICJ jurisdiction.  
One problem with the human rights treaties that confer 
jurisdiction to the ICJ, in particular, is that only state parties can 
initiate proceedings in the ICJ.238 However, in many situations, the 
victims of discrimination and other human rights violations are 
individuals. These individuals do not have the power to bring claims 
to the ICJ. Given the ICJ‘s limitations in terms of jurisdiction, the 
effectiveness and strength of the human rights treaties that give 
jurisdiction to the Court come into question. If disputes relating to the 
interpretation and application of human rights treaties cannot be 
brought to the ICJ by the individual victims of human rights 
violations, then those who should be protected by the human rights 
treaties have no way to seek redress. Furthermore, in many cases, the 
state parties are the perpetrators of human rights violations and, thus, 
have no interest in initiating proceedings in the ICJ. Since states that 
are perpetrators of human rights violations and victims are not 
bringing claims to the ICJ, the Court is not hearing the disputes 
related to the human rights treaties that give the ICJ jurisdiction. 
Several human rights treaties give jurisdiction to the ICJ, all of which 
become less effective because the ICJ is not adjudicating disputes 
related to such treaties.239 For these reasons, the ICJ plays a limited 
role in international human rights law.  
 
 235. Buys, supra note 4, at 294. 
 236. Phoebe Okowa, The International Court of Justice and the Georgia/Russia Dispute, 
11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 739, 740, 749–50 (2011). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 34(1). 
 239. The relevant treaties include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, art. 9, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 29, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 30, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
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Through its decision in this case, the ICJ has further restricted 
the role it will play as an enforcer of human rights law. As discussed 
above, the Court restricted established precedent.240 First, the ICJ 
claimed that when determining there was a dispute, it would only 
consider statements made by the executive branch instead of looking 
at other parts of government also involved in foreign policy.241 As a 
result, the Court improperly discarded evidence merely because the 
Georgian President had not officially endorsed the Georgian 
Parliament‘s statements related to ethnic cleansing and 
discrimination.242 Second, when deciding that the preconditions of 
Article 22 had not been met, the Court not only required that 
negotiations had been initiated, as required by precedent, but that 
negotiations had failed or become futile.243 Consequently, the Court 
did not consider evidence demonstrating that Georgia had initiated 
negotiations with Russia concerning racial discrimination.244 The 
Court further limited the scope of human rights cases that it may 
adjudicate. Thus, the human rights treaties that give jurisdiction to the 
ICJ only become less effective because the Court is less likely to 
enforce them. If the ICJ is not enforcing human rights treaties, then 
who will? In this case, Georgia turned to the ECHR. 
2. Regional Human Rights Courts as a Solution to the International 
Court of Justice‘s Limitation as Related to Human Rights 
Treaties 
Regional human rights courts provide an alternative to the ICJ 
when dealing with human rights violations. These regional courts, 
such as the ECHR, IACHR, and the ACJHR, allow state parties and 
individuals to initiate proceedings against states that are parties to the 
conventions establishing the courts.245  
In this case, in August 2008, Georgia submitted an application to 
initiate proceedings in the ECHR to resolve the dispute with 
 
Families, art. 92(1), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; and the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, art. 38, July 28, 1951, 198 U.N.T.S. 137. 
 240. See supra Part V.A. 
 241. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 242. See supra Part V.A. 
 243. See supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 244. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 245. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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Russia.246 It alleged that Russia had violated several provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) including 
the civilians‘ right to life under Article 2, right to liberty and security 
under Article 5, right to respect for private and family life under 
Article 8, right to education under Article 2 of the first Protocol, 
freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol number 4, the right 
to an effective remedy under Article 13.247 Finally it also claimed that 
Russia had violated the prohibition against torture under Article 3.248 
These claims were similar to the contentions that Georgia had made 
in the case in front of the ICJ. In its application to the ICJ, Georgia 
had claimed that Russia had been responsible for murdering, 
torturing, raping, deporting, and forcibly transferring ethnic 
Georgians.249 Georgia has also asserted that Russia had denied ethnic 
Georgians the right to return to their homes in South Ossetia.250 On 
December 13, 2012, the ECHR found that it had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the case between Georgia and Russia on its merits.251  
The fact that Georgia was able to initiate proceedings in two 
international courts illustrates one of the positive effects of the 
fragmentation of international law as related to human rights law. 
One of the causes of the fragmentation of international law is the 
proliferation of specialized and regional tribunals.252 The 
multiplication of jurisdiction has enlarged the scope of justiciability 
of international disputes, which many scholars have viewed 
 
 246. See Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., Preliminary 
Objections, ¶ 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html& 
documentId=897303&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id.  
 249. Application of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 81(a) (Aug. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14657.pdf.  
 250. See id. ¶ 81(c). 
 251. See Georgia v. Russia (II), ¶ 1–2. The ECHR dismissed Russia‘s claim that Georgia 
had violated Article 35 of the Convention by filing its application to Court more than six 
months after the date of the act which is said not to comply with the Convention. Id. The 
ECHR decided that it would make a final determination as to Russia‘s other preliminary 
objections in the merits portion of the case. Id. Russia‘s other objections include that the 
Convention does not apply in times of armed conflict, the Convention does not apply 
extraterritorially, and that Georgia has not satisfied the precondition to the ECHR‘s 
jurisdiction, the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Id.  
 252. See Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from the Fragmentation of 
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 849, 849–50 (2004). 
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positively.253 However, there are also problems that accompany the 
proliferation of tribunals. One problem is that the fragmentation of 
international law may cause ―conflicting and incompatible rules, 
principles, rule systems and institutional practices.‖254 Because there 
is no hierarchy between the various international courts, different 
rules develop, thus prejudicing the ―basic unity of the international 
legal order.‖255 This note does not seek to discuss in depth the issue 
of fragmentation of international law. However, it must be noted that 
the fact that the ECHR found that it could adjudicate this case 
demonstrates that the ECHR has set a different standard for finding 
jurisdiction than the ICJ. When the ECHR issues its decision on the 
merits of the case, we will have a better understanding of how much 
the ECHR and ICJ diverge when determining how human rights 
treaties apply during armed conflict. 
While the ECHR may have provided an alternate venue to 
resolve this case, there may not be such an option in other human 
rights cases. The regional human rights courts only have jurisdiction 
over the state parties to the convention establishing the court.256 Thus, 
if one state alleges that another state, which is not a party to any of 
the regional human rights conventions, has violated certain human 
rights, that state may not use the regional courts to resolve the 
dispute. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the ICJ has further 
restricted the scope of human rights cases that it may adjudicate by 
narrowing the interpretation of the Court‘s precedent when making a 
determination about jurisdiction.257 Therefore, the state parties to 
human rights treaties giving jurisdiction to the ICJ must wait until 
negotiations become futile before initiating proceedings. Waiting 
until that point may increase the number of human rights violations 
committed. Thus, there are situations in which states alleging human 
rights violations may not be able to initiate proceedings in any 
international court. 
 
 253. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger Of Fragmentation Or Unification Of The 
International Legal System And The International Court Of Justice, 31 INT‘L L. & POL. 791, 
796 (1999). 
 254. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 
9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, 14, U.N DOC. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 16, 2006). 
 255. Dupuy, supra note 253, at 792. 
 256. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 257. See supra Part V.A.2. 
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3. Domestic Courts as a Solution to the International Court of 
Justice‘s Limitation in Human Rights Treaties 
In the cases where regional courts do not have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate cases, individuals could initiate proceedings in domestic 
courts. However, the ICJ recently held that Italy had violated its 
obligation to respect Germany‘s sovereign immunity by allowing 
individuals to bring civil claims against Germany in Italian domestic 
courts based on violations of international humanitarian law 
committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945.258 The ICJ 
also found that Italy failed to respect Germany‘s sovereign immunity 
when Italian domestic courts enforced decisions of Greek courts 
finding that the German Reich had committed violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Greece.259 Therefore, 
victims of human rights violations by a state may not seek redress in 
domestic courts since domestic courts do not have the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate such claims due to the state‘s sovereign immunity. 
The limitations on both international and domestic courts‘ 
jurisdiction has created a gap in who will enforce human rights. The 
ICJ further limited its ability to adjudicate claims arising from human 
rights treaties in its decision in Georgia v. Russian Federation by 
reading precedent narrowly and requiring high standards for finding 
jurisdiction.260 The regional human rights courts are also limited in 
the cases they can adjudicate because they do not have universal 
jurisdiction.261 Lastly, domestic courts cannot adjudicate human 
rights claims against states because the ICJ has found that such cases 
violate sovereign immunity.262 If the courts are not adjudicating 
human rights claims, where can they be resolved? This gap in the 
court system is problematic because resolving human rights disputes 
is better accomplished through the courts than negotiations or 
diplomacy because courts are, theoretically, impartial bodies.263 An 
 
 258. Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 139 (Feb. 
3).  
 259. Id.  
 260. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 261. See supra Part V.B.2. 
 262. See Ger. V. It., 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 139. 
 263. See Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the 
European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (2008) (―Scholars of 
various theoretical persuasions agree that impartiality should be a defining quality of such 
bodies.‖). 
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impartial third party is important to resolve human rights disputes 
because one state party may be politically, economically, or militarily 
stronger than the other thus, increasing the possibility of unfairness in 
negotiations.  
CONCLUSION  
The ICJ already has a limited role in international human rights 
law since only states are able to bring claims to the Court. In this 
case, the ICJ further limited its role in human rights law by only 
considering executive branch statements when determining that a 
dispute exists. Furthermore, it restricted provisions similar to Article 
22 of CERD when it determined that negotiations must have failed or 
become futile before the Court will have jurisdiction. These 
requirements further limit the number of human rights cases that the 
ICJ may hear as well as decrease the limited role the ICJ plays in 
international human rights law. Thus, the human rights treaties 
themselves become less effective because the ICJ is not adjudicating 
cases and, thus, not enforcing the treaties. Furthermore, while state 
parties and individuals may initiate proceedings in regional human 
rights courts, these courts only have jurisdiction over state parties to 
the courts‘ conventions. Furthermore, the ICJ recently held that 
domestic courts do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims 
made against states who violated human rights. Thus, there is a gap in 
who will enforce human rights, which is problematic since courts 
provide a relatively fairer forum to resolve human rights disputes 
than negotiations between parties. The ICJ‘s decision in this case has 
only further widened this gap. Thus, the question remains, who will 
enforce human rights? 
 
